Derailment and fire in Quebec

[dibber25]

I don't recall this question being raised before and I apologise for repeating it, if it has already been dealt with. From this report we learn that the 5017 was already in a bad way during the journey and before it stopped at Nantes. I had picked this up, too, from a reported conversation between the engineer and the taxi driver, the engineer allegedly having told the taxi driver that he didn't like leaving the locomotive smoking and sparking as it was. There were three - or was it four? - other locomotives at the head of this train. My question is this - would it have been possible to leave one of the other locomotives running to charge the brakes, or does it HAVE to be the lead locomotive?

CHRIS LEIGH

[dibber25]

Transport Canada track inspection shuts down 12.5Km section of MMA http://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/mediaroom/MMAR_Summary.pdf . General criticism of clusters of marginal, substandard ties, substandard rail joints, level crossing condition and vegetation growth, with particular concern on a section of line close to a propane depot.

 

The closed section appears to be a branch rather than a section of the main line, I wonder was it actually in use?

This branch, perhaps? Exaggerated by a telephoto lens but very poor nevertheless.

 

http://www.railpictures.net/viewphoto.php?id=358106&nseq=125

 

CHRIS LEIGH

[dave1905]

Transport Canada track inspection shuts down 12.5Km section of MMA http://www.tc.gc.ca/media/documents/mediaroom/MMAR_Summary.pdf . General criticism of clusters of marginal, substandard ties, substandard rail joints, level crossing condition and vegetation growth, with particular concern on a section of line close to a propane depot.

 

The closed section appears to be a branch rather than a section of the main line, I wonder was it actually in use?

 

Track takes years to degrade.  I wonder where TC was last year?  Or the year before? 

[dave1905]

This branch, perhaps? Exaggerated by a telephoto lens but very poor nevertheless.

 

http://www.railpictures.net/viewphoto.php?id=358106&nseq=125

 

CHRIS LEIGH

 

Under normal circumstances this forum would talk about how cool it would be to model this, then post links to the Maumee and to the person doing the raggedy branch line in winter.

[Ohmisterporter]

Remarks & Notes  The track on MMA's Saint-Guillaume Branch in Sainte-Rosalie is one of the worse I have ever seen. Just look at how the loco is leaning! It is 85-lb track that is almost a century old!

 

The quote is from the picture linked in posting #710. I can't understand what's wrong with some people. Either you pay money out wisely to shareholders or you waste it on track repairs. I think I have the right frame of mind to be a railroad CEO.

[Glorious NSE]

That's why I am wondering about the crew.  If the two trains meet at Nantes and both have to wait for the crew crews to rest, you have blocked both the main and the siding for 6-8 hours.  Unless there is only a train or two a day, that's not the best plan. 

 

I'm not convinced they were running enough trains for it to have been an issue, but my *assumption* is the WB train went into the siding East of town, the EB train held the main at Nantes to the West of town, either one can then leave first whilst the other stays standing, and if you needed to get past both of them with something extra you could. 

 

Geoff - as they have pretty consistently lost money, I doubt much was spent on payments to shareholders...

[John M]

Track takes years to degrade.  I wonder where TC was last year?  Or the year before? 

 

 

The inspection report indicates that TC carried out regular inspections of the main-line but not the two branch lines, which were probably considered low risk on account of low traffic levels and speed.

 

There is a clip on the Stanbridge Subdivision at 2:10 in

 and probably had a legacy of deferred maintenance when the lines were spun off by CP in the 1990s.

 

The history of railroading in the area since the 70s has been one of a struggle for survival, bankruptcies and line abandonment. It will be interesting to see if Quebec and Maine will step in and fund MNA track renewals or the line is abandoned and converted to a snow mobile trail like the St. Johnsville & Lamoille Valley.

Edited September 14, 2013 by John M

[highpeak]

Railway Age is reporting that arrests are anticipated: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/freight/short-lines/arrests-anticipated-in-lac-megantics-wake.html

 

[PhilJ W]

Railway Age is reporting that arrests are anticipated: http://www.railwayage.com/index.php/freight/short-lines/arrests-anticipated-in-lac-megantics-wake.html

It comes up Error 509

[dullsteamer]

...from a human nature perspective, thinking that another crew was going to be on the train quickly might adversely affect a person's sense of risk.  I have read of many occaisions where people shortcutted safety because of a short term situation...

 

Much as I hate to point the finger at a fellow engineman, I suspect that's exactly what's happened here. And I speak from experience. In my younger, less responsible days I've taken shortcuts. Rather than properly secure my train I simply left it standing on the independent brake only, because my relief wasn't far way - or so I thought. I was lucky on that occasion, and got away with it. I suspect that the bloke at Lac Megantic did something similar.

 

All the best,

 

Mark.

[dullsteamer]

My question is this - would it have been possible to leave one of the other locomotives running to charge the brakes, or does it HAVE to be the lead locomotive?

 

Normally yes, because that's the loco which will have its brake stand cut-in. If you were going to use another loco in the consist to keep the brake pipe charged then you would have to cut in its brake stand instead.

 

All the best,

 

Mark.

[dave1905]

Normally yes, because that's the loco which will have its brake stand cut-in. If you were going to use another loco in the consist to keep the brake pipe charged then you would have to cut in its brake stand instead.

 

All the best,

 

Mark.

 

One would have to make it very clear that another unit was set up to control so the relieving engineer got his controls set up properly.

 

The danger that this illustrates is people get used to a condition and then stop questioning it.  If the engines were all raggedy second hand units and often had minor mechanical problems it becomes easier for a person to accept a subsequent problem as just another minor problem and not a precursor to a catastrophic failure.   The engineer noted the engine was having problems, but evidently not enough or unusually more than normal to take action.

 

Not saying its right, just saying its human nature.

[dibber25]

All of which still leads me to think that if this train had been parked on a well-designed siding with trap points, none of the other failings or defects would have mattered. A couple of cars would have trundled off the road into a sand-drag. However, none of these developments come about unless they are prompted by something - usually a catastrophe - which prompts people to look at ways of averting such a thing in the future. 

The next thing that needs looking at is the continued use of locally, hand-operated turnouts with minimal indication of the way they are set, on lines used by passenger trains (see the recent TSB report into a VIA train turned onto a siding by a switch left reversed). 

CHRIS LEIGH

[The Stationmaster]

All of which still leads me to think that if this train had been parked on a well-designed siding with trap points, none of the other failings or defects would have mattered. A couple of cars would have trundled off the road into a sand-drag. However, none of these developments come about unless they are prompted by something - usually a catastrophe - which prompts people to look at ways of averting such a thing in the future. 

The next thing that needs looking at is the continued use of locally, hand-operated turnouts with minimal indication of the way they are set, on lines used by passenger trains (see the recent TSB report into a VIA train turned onto a siding by a switch left reversed). 

CHRIS LEIGH

Or even if it had been properly secured with hand brakes - including a pull test.

[pH]

All of which still leads me to think that if this train had been parked on a well-designed siding with trap points, none of the other failings or defects would have mattered. A couple of cars would have trundled off the road into a sand-drag. However, none of these developments come about unless they are prompted by something - usually a catastrophe - which prompts people to look at ways of averting such a thing in the future. 

CHRIS LEIGH

It's been said this before in this topic, but I will say it again - order Canadian railroad companies operating one or two trains a day over 10-20MPH track with 20-30 year old engines and losing money, or just cleaning their face, to upgrade all sidings on their lines, and the only thing that will happen is that they will close the line and go out of business. And proper application of existing rules should have been enough to avert this tragedy.

 

The next thing that needs looking at is the continued use of locally, hand-operated turnouts with minimal indication of the way they are set, on lines used by passenger trains (see the recent TSB report into a VIA train turned onto a siding by a switch left reversed).

CHRIS LEIGH

Operating arrangements on the Windsor-Quebec City corridor where high-speed passenger trains mix with slow, heavy freights and local switching freights on multiple track lines are, IMO, a completely separate subject from (relatively) slow speed, heavy freight only operations on single track lines elsewhere in the country. For the record, I agree with what you say with reference to Windsor-Quebec City.

Edited September 17, 2013 by pH

[dibber25]

It's been said this before in this topic, but I will say it again - order Canadian railroad companies operating one or two trains a day over 10-20MPH track with 20-30 year old engines and losing money, or just cleaning their face, to upgrade all sidings on their lines, and the only thing that will happen is that they will close the line and go out of business. And proper application of existing rules should have been enough to avert this tragedy.

 

 

Operating arrangements on the Windsor-Quebec City corridor where high-speed passenger trains mix with slow, heavy freights and local switching freights on multiple track lines are, IMO, a completely separate subject from (relatively) slow speed, heavy freight only operations on single track lines elsewhere in the country. For the record, I agree with what you say with reference to Windsor-Quebec City.

Separate issues, yes, but both are safety issues and one has already had serious consequences and the other one will, sooner or later. Taking the harsh point of view, if MMA had spent the money and put in trap points at Nantes or decided not to spend the money and close the line, either way there would be people alive today who aren't. Frankly, if a railway can't or won't provide such basic safety measures, I would prefer it to close before there's an accident, rather than after, as seems likely to happen with MMA. The oil companies need to have the oil moved and, if they are pushed hard enough, they'll pay to have it moved safely.

CHRIS LEIGH

[dullsteamer]

One would have to make it very clear that another unit was set up to control so the relieving engineer got his controls set up properly.

 

Absolutely, which is why I wouldn't do it. Too much likelihood of having two brakestands cut in. I only made that comment to explain the normal procedure for setting up the brakes on multiple locos in a consist. Perhaps I didn't explain myself properly!

 

All the best,

 

Mark.

[dave1905]

Absolutely, which is why I wouldn't do it. Too much likelihood of having two brakestands cut in. I only made that comment to explain the normal procedure for setting up the brakes on multiple locos in a consist. Perhaps I didn't explain myself properly!

 

All the best,

 

Mark.

 

No, just wanted to make sure others realized that closing one "hole" sometimes opens another.  Probably if you were going to cut in another unit you would swap it to the lead position, which is not an easy proposition for a 1 man crew. 

 

Simplicity is the best solution.  Having an effective securement plan, verifying the crews are following it, works any place, on any track with cars, trains, engines, with air brakes, without air brakes, whatever, for no capital expense, no development time and a minor incremental cost.

 

Not opposed to the high dollar point solution, major railroads probably have hundreds of derails in various sidings, just have seen or read of too many situations where split point derails in the conventional places would not have prevented the accident, but better securement would have.  A derail only works where there is a derail (if they line it).  Securement works everywhere (if they do it).

[kevinlms]

It's been said this before in this topic, but I will say it again - order Canadian railroad companies operating one or two trains a day over 10-20MPH track with 20-30 year old engines and losing money, or just cleaning their face, to upgrade all sidings on their lines, and the only thing that will happen is that they will close the line and go out of business. And proper application of existing rules should have been enough to avert this tragedy.

 

Yes, but something seriously went wrong with the 'proper application of existing rules should of been enough to avert this tragedy'. Either the rules simply weren't adequate or they weren't carried out correctly.

One or the other is almost certainly true.

[Oldddudders]

Are we not getting circular in our arguments?

When did that ever stop a thread from thriving?

[dibber25]

Yes, the circular arguments really come down to a difference in the national approach to things.

In North America they make rules and expect people to obey them (and in most cases they do). In the UK we make rules, expecting that someone will break them, and we have back-ups in place to mitigate that. 

CHRIS LEIGH

[dibber25]

Just read the Toronto Globe & Mail's interview with Hunter Harrison (of CP Rail). My corporate BS detector was overworked!

So Canadian railways are 'forced by law' to carry hazardous materials. So, had they NOT been 'forced', they would have actually turned away the 28,000% increase in crude oil traffic? Pull the other one!

Regulators should enforce the introduction of tank cars with double skins and side and end protection to replace the DOT-111 cars. Will he pay for them? Even if he does it'll take years to phase out the DOT-111 cars.

There should be stiffer penalties for individuals and companies which mis-label hazardous goods. Yes, there probably should, but would it have made any difference at Lac Megantic if the (allegedly mis-labelled) crude had been correctly labelled? Would MMA have handled it differently? As I understand it, it would only have affected the emergency response, but by that time it was already too late.

CHRIS LEIGH

[Adrian Wintle]

There should be stiffer penalties for individuals and companies which mis-label hazardous goods. Yes, there probably should, but would it have made any difference at Lac Megantic if the (allegedly mis-labelled) crude had been correctly labelled? Would MMA have handled it differently? As I understand it, it would only have affected the emergency response, but by that time it was already too late.

 

If the content of the cars was what it was labelled as it is much more likely that the accident would have been an enviromental issue (spilled crude) rather than a disaster (burning crude). It is unclear whether the labelling of the cars as containing a higher-volatility substance would have affected how the train was parked or, potentially, how much care was taken in that respect.

 

If you think that there isn't a particular danger involved in handling a substance you are much less likely to take extra care while handling it.

 

Adrian

[dave1905]

If the content of the cars was what it was labelled as it is much more likely that the accident would have been an enviromental issue (spilled crude) rather than a disaster (burning crude). It is unclear whether the labelling of the cars as containing a higher-volatility substance would have affected how the train was parked or, potentially, how much care was taken in that respect.

 

If you think that there isn't a particular danger involved in handling a substance you are much less likely to take extra care while handling it.

 

I don't understand the logic here.  As far as train handling goes there is one class of flammable liquid.  A car of fuel oil is handled the same way as a car of gasoline as a car of diesel as a car of crude oil as a car of ethanol.  Same laws, same rules, same handling, same train placement, same switching requirements.  Any labeling issues (PG 1 vs PG 2) would not have changed anything with regard to how the railroad was required to handle the cars or how the railroad would have handled the cars. 

 

For example a "key train" in the US is a train with 20 or more hazardous loaded cars.  Doesn't matter what type.  Same restrictions apply  to all.  20 cars of fertilizer (oxidizer) is the same as 20 cars of gasoline (flammable liquid) is the same as 20 cars of LPG (flammable gas) is the same as 20 cars of ammunition (explosives 1.4).

 

The only difference was paperwork (the documentation was incorrect) and possibly in emergency response.

[Oldddudders]

 

If you think that there isn't a particular danger involved in handling a substance you are much less likely to take extra care while handling it.

 

 

I take your point, but actually the crewman didn't want the train to roll away irrespective of its load. Had it been inert - e.g. stone or coal - he would have had just the same basic concern for it staying put.