Level crossing stupidity...

[The Stationmaster]

For the obvious reason, in this case that the signaller is being asked to tell persons wishing to cross the track if it is safe to cross, and hence needs to know if the train is approaching the crossing or has passed. Nothing to do with block sections or signalling routes.

 

Of course lots of things were done to save money, not always with justification, all depends on the attitude to risks at the time. And as SM did say, keeping the lineside clear of trees, as used to be done makes a big difference to the risk. Putting in the phone gave the signaller a job but did not give them the means to do it properly.

regards

 

*been designing, installing and maintaining axle counters, among other things, for 40 years

 

The section in question has (or at least had) track circuits when it was converted to Track Circuit block so they are, as Phil explained and you will obviously understand, a number of track circuits over the very long section from Castle Cary to Yeovil PM.  But they are show as either a single (or possibly three) indication sections on Westbury panel and it would definitely be a very expensive job to alter that to show what might be considered relevant sections of track circuiting for this crossing.

 

On another thing Phil a PM will be  on its way shortly but I remain very unhappy with the idea of lumping everything together as 'level crossings' when so many of those included patently aren't statutory level crossings.  I fully appreciate that things have changed - very considerably - but i do worry that this sort of lumping together sells short teh great strides made with safety at statutory crossings and mixes several very different things together.

 

Incidentally on another point there was a GPs based signalling system proposed for the WCML back in the late 1990s and a lot of development work took place, partly in connection with the control point at Saltley.  All affected train operators were visited by part of the technical team and at my OC they saw myself and the Deputy MD as their starting and, as it tuned out, finishing point.  The on-train electronics needed in connection with the system - moving block based on GPS for ascertaining train position and speed etc with full communication with the control centre was going to be placed in a box approximately the size of an adult coffin.  No doubt miniaturisation has since taken place but the on-train fit would I expect still be fairly space consuming.  For some reason which I couldn't fathom the system proposed at that time was satellite based rather than using the far more accurate Differential GPS although that had not gone live in the UK at that time; oddly the (US) experts who were coming up with the plans were unable ti guarantee wholly effective operation during intense sun-spot periods or other severe solar activity.  No - it obviously wouldn't work in tunnels and they would be provided with some sort of more traditional train detection.

[Coryton]

reason which I couldn't fathom the system proposed at that time was satellite based rather than using the far more accurate Differential GPS although that had not gone live in the UK at that time; oddly the (US) experts who were coming up with the plans were unable ti guarantee wholly effective operation during intense sun-spot periods or other severe solar activity.  No - it obviously wouldn't work in tunnels and they would be provided with some sort of more traditional train detection.

 

Differential GPS is still satellite based and uses the same satellite signals as regular GPS. The difference is that it reduces errors by receiving signals obtained from GPS receivers in fixed positions. To put it simply, if the position obtained by  a GPS receiver in a known position is 10 m to the east of where it knows it is, then mobile receivers nearby are likely to be 10 m west of where they say they are.

[Coryton]

Speaking generally, and also from my own opinions rather than anyone's definitions, both the liklihood of something happening and the severity of the consequences (so if the chances are the same something that'll leave a bruise is lower risk than something that will kill). I also wouldn't be inclined to discount the effects of numerous near misses on drivers even if they never hit anyone, having your heart in your mouth every day isn't any good for anyone.

 

 

Well that's the usual definition of risk: likelihood multiplied by severity.

 

Where I think it gets a bit murkier is how you take the numbers of people involved into account. If the odds of something happening to any particular individual are the same in two different situations. Take two identical crossings, with the same chance of getting hurt on both, but one gets used by ten times as many people. The risks are the same for all individuals whichever they use but the one getting used by ten times the number will get the attention because ten times as many people will get hurt on it. Conversely one that might be very dangerous to use will probably be forgotten about if no-one has used it for the last fifty years.

 

I would say it depends what you're using the result for.

 

If I'm an individual deciding whether to take the quick route across the line or walk the long way round over a bridge, I want to know the individual risk (so depends on train frequency but not number of users).

 

If I'm Network Rail deciding whether to spend the money on a new bridge so I can close the crossing, I do want to take the number of users into account so I can trade risk against money.

 

If I'm deciding whether to close the crossing and just make people walk the long way round then I'd argue the first one is correct. But then again if I want to make sure I'm not prosecuted for allowing a dangerous crossing to remain open and don't want bad publicity I'd presumably use the second one, with the consequence that the popular crossings get closed inconveniencing a lot more people than closing the rarely used ones.

 

 

Speaking generally, and also from my own opinions rather than anyone's definitions, both the liklihood of something happening and the severity of the consequences (so if the chances are the same something that'll leave a bruise is lower risk than something that will kill). I also wouldn't be inclined to discount the effects of numerous near misses on drivers even if they never hit anyone, having your heart in your mouth every day isn't any good for anyone.

 

Where I think it gets a bit murkier is how you take the numbers of people involved into account. If the odds of something happening to any particular individual are the same in two different situations. Take two identical crossings, with the same chance of getting hurt on both, but one gets used by ten times as many people. The risks are the same for all individuals whichever they use but the one getting used by ten times the number will get the attention because ten times as many people will get hurt on it. Conversely one that might be very dangerous to use will probably be forgotten about if no-one has used it for the last fifty years.

 

Speaking generally, and also from my own opinions rather than anyone's definitions, both the liklihood of something happening and the severity of the consequences (so if the chances are the same something that'll leave a bruise is lower risk than something that will kill). I also wouldn't be inclined to discount the effects of numerous near misses on drivers even if they never hit anyone, having your heart in your mouth every day isn't any good for anyone.

 

Where I think it gets a bit murkier is how you take the numbers of people involved into account. If the odds of something happening to any particular individual are the same in two different situations. Take two identical crossings, with the same chance of getting hurt on both, but one gets used by ten times as many people. The risks are the same for all individuals whichever they use but the one getting used by ten times the number will get the attention because ten times as many people will get hurt on it. Conversely one that might be very dangerous to use will probably be forgotten about if no-one has used it for the last fifty years.

 

[Grovenor]

The section in question has (or at least had) track circuits when it was converted to Track Circuit block so they are, as Phil explained and you will obviously understand, a number of track circuits over the very long section from Castle Cary to Yeovil PM.  But they are show as either a single (or possibly three) indication sections on Westbury panel and it would definitely be a very expensive job to alter that to show what might be considered relevant sections of track circuiting for this crossing.

I did agree that retrofitting would be very expensive, had the indication of level crossing approaches been in the original requirements it would have been a marginal cost item. But such things would not then have been in the requirements, and most likely would not be now. The whole system approach is lacking in this area, the consequencies of adding in a phone and requirement to ask the signaller if its safe left a hole in the system. Ironically this is one area where the change from track circuit to axle counter for long block sections would substantially increase the cost if such approach indications were put into the requirements.

Regards

[96701]

The risk scores are calculated from the algorithms that are buried in All Level Crossings Risk Model (ALCRM). Risk assessments are undertaking by Level Crossing Managers at a frequency taken from the risk score and can be 1 year and 3 months, 2 years and 3 months or 3 years and 3 months. Risk assessments are also triggered by reported miss use or near misses. The reason for adding 3 months onto the frequencies is to pick up seasonal variations on usage, so every risk assessment is preceded by a site visit to carry out an in depth census of use. 

 

The risk calculation algorithms within ALCRM take type and quantity of pedestrian, animal and vehicle traffic, type of train, speed and quantity and environment of the crossing. The hard factual numbers are extrapolated by the LCMs into a Narrative Risk Assessment which is more like a report rather than just hard numbers. Before any risk assessment is finalised, a number of options for improving safety have to be considered. Such options are costed so that priorities can be set in order to reduce the overall risk, which is measured at route level and nationally every period.

 

The LCMs also visit level crossings on a more frequent basis to carry out inspections of the 'hardware' and to build relationships with the users of user worked crossings. They also liaise with councils, ramblers, uncle tom cobbley and all who might wander, drive or crawl across a crossing.

[Ozexpatriate]

I haven't been following this thread, so I don't know what's current.

 

This dashcam video is scary.

 

The usual rules apply - the accident is under investigation etc. It is not obvious whether there is serious injury, but note when the barrier gates descend. 

 

Conditions are pretty awful. This is North Salt Lake in Utah from January 21, 2017.  This episode appears worthy of the term 'accident'. I don't see any foolish behaviour here.

Edited January 27, 2017 by Ozexpatriate

[Coryton]

The risk scores are calculated from the algorithms that are buried in All Level Crossings Risk Model (ALCRM). Risk assessments are undertaking by Level Crossing Managers at a frequency taken from the risk score and can be 1 year and 3 months, 2 years and 3 months or 3 years and 3 months. Risk assessments are also triggered by reported miss use or near misses. The reason for adding 3 months onto the frequencies is to pick up seasonal variations on usage, so every risk assessment is preceded by a site visit to carry out an in depth census of use. 

 

The risk calculation algorithms within ALCRM take type and quantity of pedestrian, animal and vehicle traffic, type of train, speed and quantity and environment of the crossing. The hard factual numbers are extrapolated by the LCMs into a Narrative Risk Assessment which is more like a report rather than just hard numbers. Before any risk assessment is finalised, a number of options for improving safety have to be considered. Such options are costed so that priorities can be set in order to reduce the overall risk, which is measured at route level and nationally every period.

 

The LCMs also visit level crossings on a more frequent basis to carry out inspections of the 'hardware' and to build relationships with the users of user worked crossings. They also liaise with councils, ramblers, uncle tom cobbley and all who might wander, drive or crawl across a crossing.

 

Thank you. Most informative.

 

I'm still surprised that what I consider an extremely safe crossing as these things go comes out as such a high risk.

 

I've used quite a few foot crossings that made me a nervous, but you'd really have to not be paying attention to go under a train at this one.

[martin_wynne]

The discussion about risk is interesting, but doesn't seem relevant to the current incident which we were discussing.

 

That wasn't caused by a risky crossing or any other assessment of it. It was caused by the crossing user being told that it was safe to cross when it wasn't:  

 

 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safety-digest-022017-thorney-marsh-lane/near-miss-at-thorney-marsh-lane-level-crossing-castle-cary-somerset-26-november-2016

 

Martin.

[royaloak]

Last night on BBC Oxford a local farmer found his only crossing to the rest of his farm closed by NR ,the reporter did state that a dispute was in progress about the crossing .But this was hardly touched on and NR were made the bad boys for closing the crossing ,the line is Aylesbury to Calvert which is due to be upgraded for the East West line.The overall view of the reporter seemed to be for the former no comments were made by NR I wonder if they were consulted?

I dont know the crossing or area in question but NR normally only close a crossing like that if it suffers from continuous misuse, of course NR might not be able to comment while the dispute is ongoing, something the aggrieved party would be more than happy to take advantage of.

 

I could also be miles off the mark!

[The Stationmaster]

The discussion about risk is interesting, but doesn't seem relevant to the current incident which we were discussing.

 

That wasn't caused by a risky crossing or any other assessment of it. It was caused by the crossing user being told that it was safe to cross when it wasn't:  

 

 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/safety-digest-022017-thorney-marsh-lane/near-miss-at-thorney-marsh-lane-level-crossing-castle-cary-somerset-26-november-2016

 

Martin.

 

Although in fact if you follow the points we have discussed regarding track circuit indications and the Signlman(ler)'s workload it could be demonstrated that there is actually an increase in risk with this sort of crossing in the control area of a large powerbox.  In. say, Absolute Block or Electric Token territory the Signalman will have easy reference to a fairly accurate record of the time the train entered the section and local knowledge/experience to tell how roughly how long it will take to reach the crossing.  Still not perfect nbut he does at least have a factual basis to work from when answering a 'phone call from the crossing.

 

In a panel 'box he might well have none of that - he can assume, righty or wrongly, that the train is running on time but will probably only be truly aware of its timekeeping when it is well adrift and he has no record at all of the time it entered the section in question unless he has access to Automatic Train Reporting or time to make an enquiry on a computer system he might or might not have access to.  He might well have set a route for the train a long time before it was actually expected and be dealing with pressing problems or other trains elsewhere in his control area so it is not impossible that whatever he might say on the 'phone could be no more than guesswork and that can go wrong, especially if other matters are taking his attention.

 

As Grovenor has pointed out 'The whole system approach is lacking in this area, the consequences of adding in a phone and requirement to ask the signaller if its safe left a hole in the system.'  Again in the case of these sort of crossings we are looking at some very different factors from those involving fully protected public roads. 

[martin_wynne]

As Grovenor has pointed out 'The whole system approach is lacking in this area, the consequences of adding in a phone and requirement to ask the signaller if its safe left a hole in the system.'  Again in the case of these sort of crossings we are looking at some very different factors from those involving fully protected public roads. 

 

Hi Mike,

 

So what is the railway's reply to a passenger who asks, not unreasonably, why his life depended on the quick thinking of a farm tractor driver?

 

If we can't have on-board GPS, how about a device attached to the existing telephone line, which can transmit to the signaller the time at which the last train passed the crossing? Even Morse Code would do. Not every safety feature has to be integrated into the full signalling system.

 

Martin.

[phil-b259]

Not every safety feature has to be integrated into the full signalling system.

 

Martin.

Yes it does.

 

ANYTHING which has ANY role in a level crossing presents a threat to safety of it goes wrong.

 

For example any public level crossing (footpath*, bridal-path, highways) fitted with telephones require monitoring system that alerts the signaller if they are not in a working condition and rules state that the signaller must start cautioning trains if it fails.

 

As such we don't do Heath Robinson type lash ups - however well intentioned they may be. If an upgrade to the crossing protection is required then it has to be done using approved methods - which don't come cheap precisely because equipment failure and its consiquences have to be addressed.

 

As the RAIB report makes very clear - this near miss was basically due to the correct procedures not being followed when the signaller was contacted by the user requesting permission to cross. Any further incidences can quite easily be prevented by issuing a box instruction that the signaller is not to speculate on trains positions - they must deny all requests to cross until the train has left the entire section (as seen on the signallers panel).

 

* Note some crossings combine two types e.g. a public footpath and an occupation crossing for a farmer to access his land with vehicles

Edited January 28, 2017 by phil-b259

[The Stationmaster]

Hi Mike,

 

So what is the railway's reply to a passenger who asks, not unreasonably, why his life depended on the quick thinking of a farm tractor driver?

 

If we can't have on-board GPS, how about a device attached to the existing telephone line, which can transmit to the signaller the time at which the last train passed the crossing? Even Morse Code would do. Not every safety feature has to be integrated into the full signalling system.

 

Martin.

 

I can't really see any sensible reply to that passenger to be honest Martin other than one that the level of risk is small.  That is why I see - and always have seen - occupation and accommodation crossings as very different from statutory level crossings because there is no requirement for them to have anything approaching the level of protection incorporated in even the most basic of public highway crossings which are sited on running lines (or indeed in some cases are on what are little more than sidings).

 

For some occupation and accommodation crossings user familiarity provides a pretty good level of safety while at some there can be a positive advantage in having telephone contact with a signalbox; but when they are in long sections - as in the case of this incident - the latter can turn out to be illusory in some circumstances.  The problem is that such crossings were effectively established by the original legislation authorising the construction of the line and it can be time and cash expensive to get rid of them but huge numbers have been closed over the years, the old trick being to see how overgrown the ground was around the gates and use that as evidence for closure.

 

A warning system would be one answer - simple annunciators operated by treadle and some sort of display at the gate and/or signalbox (something has been tested and came up earlier in this thread I recall) and that might will be cheaper than closing the crossing if closure requires new bridgeworks.  In the case of closures on the GWML, and elsewhere, for the introduction of HSTs a lower cost alternative has been to build the farmer or whoever an internal roadway parallel to the railway to the nearest existing safe crossing point.  Exactly that was done at a crossing (Sheephouse Farm) on the Westbury side of Castle Cary which had a bad accident rate - BR probably saved money closing it.

 

These crossings have been around since the dawn of railways and the incident rate involving an actual collision is probably still fairly low - (when that one was on my patch) in a period of 4 years we only had two collisions on such crossings so the rate/incidence was very low but both were expensive in damage with no human casualties but considerable livestock deaths and damage to rolling stock; one of those was at Sheephouse (trainee Signalman's error) while the other was at Forde Abbey near Chard and was the farmer's error.  

 

But as ever mitigating or removing the risk will cost money and equally the risk mitigation will inevitably be assessed in financial terms.

[Coryton]

As such we don't do Heath Robinson type lash ups - however well intentioned they may be. If an upgrade to the crossing protection is required then it has to be done using approved methods - which don't come cheap precisely because equipment failure and its consiquences have to be addressed.

 

 

So a simple treadle-based device which used the existing phone line to register in the signalbox (or whatever)  what time the last train passed would presumably need to be fully approved etc. because of the risk involved if it gave an inaccurate response.

 

But asking the farmer "Did you see a train go past recently?" is OK...

[big jim]

All the discussion regards precise location of trains, ERTMS can pin point a train to within a meter of it's actual location, the in cab display can show the meterage on the screen

 

Both the driver of a train and the signalling centre in Machynlleth can see exactly where the train is from the start point of the system (i.e. The ertms start point is 0 meters radiating out to Pwllheli and Aberystwyth respectively)

[Coryton]

All the discussion regards precise location of trains, ERTMS can pin point a train to within a meter of it's actual location, the in cab display can show the meterage on the screen

 

Both the driver of a train and the signalling centre in Machynlleth can see exactly where the train is from the start point of the system (i.e. The ertms start point is 0 meters radiating out to Pwllheli and Aberystwyth respectively)

 

Wasn't there a problem on the Cambrian with level crossings protected by lineside signals and so completely separate from the ERTMS system where the driver looks at a screen for signal information?

[phil-b259]

So a simple treadle-based device which used the existing phone line to register in the signalbox (or whatever)  what time the last train passed would presumably need to be fully approved etc. because of the risk involved if it gave an inaccurate response.

 

But asking the farmer "Did you see a train go past recently?" is OK...

 

Which is why the RAIB report was heavily critical of the verbal communications involved.

 

Like I said the simple answer is to bar the signaller from giving permission for the user to cross while the train is in section - regardless of where exactly it might be.

 

Clear, concise and perfectly safe with no need for non approved systems.

[big jim]

Wasn't there a problem on the Cambrian with level crossings protected by lineside signals and so completely separate from the ERTMS system where the driver looks at a screen for signal information?

Maybe early on in the system testing but as there are no 'real' line side signals anymore it's not an issue that I'm aware of, I've still not been passed out on ertms yet!

[martin_wynne]

Clear, concise and perfectly safe with no need for non approved systems.

 

Not if the delay is so long that the crossing user is tempted to risk it. On a farm, like any other business, time costs money.

 

Martin.

[big jim]

Not if the delay is so long that the crossing user is tempted to risk it. On a farm, like any other business, time costs money.

 

Martin.

There was a crossing failure on a job I was on last week, told to travel at caution over a half barrier only if it was safe to do so, of course I'm doing 30mph while recording and the crossing was 20 mins down the line, when I got there it was failed in the down position with a row of cars waiting at the barriers, however at the open side there was a van who's passenger had got out and was looking up the tracks to see if anything was coming, no doubt had I not appeared they would have taken the chance and gone across, I phoned the box to advise them they need to get people out there asap as people were getting impatient

[St. Simon]

Not if the delay is so long that the crossing user is tempted to risk it. On a farm, like any other business, time costs money.

 

Martin.

There are standards govening the limit between crossing initiation and the first train arriving.

 

Simon

[Coryton]

There are standards govening the limit between crossing initiation and the first train arriving.

 

Simon

 

For a crossing with barriers or red lights maybe.

 

But this was referring to occupation crossings with phones, where all the signaller knows is that the train is in section (possibly out of sight having already passed the crossing).

 

If it's a long section it could be quite a while before the signaller is able to inform the user that the crossing is safe to use.

[big jim]

For a crossing with barriers or red lights maybe.

 

But this was referring to occupation crossings with phones, where all the signaller knows is that the train is in section (possibly out of sight having already passed the crossing).

 

If it's a long section it could be quite a while before the signaller is able to inform the user that the crossing is safe to use.

I've also had a signaller tell a farmer that he couldn't cross as I was in section (Wrexham to pen-y-fordd) but he sstill crossed in front of me anyway on a crossing that was in plain view of the signal box at the end of the platform, we was reported and subsequently charged/fined etc

 

It was quite surreal as I was trundling along In a 153 unit and As he crossed I thought 'oh look a Land Rover and trailer' before about 10 seconds later thinking 'hang on that's not right!', I went to the box during the station stop and asked if I'd actually seen what I just had and the signal woman said 'yes, I'd told him not to cross' she said he'd waited about 10 mins for me then just went across

 

Nowadays you tend to get a gsm-r call from the box asking if you have passed over a certain crossing if there is any uncertainty, although that is quite a rare occurance

Edited January 28, 2017 by big jim

[phil-b259]

Not if the delay is so long that the crossing user is tempted to risk it. On a farm, like any other business, time costs money.

 

Martin.

 

And?

 

An 'Occupation crossing' is NOT the same as a level crossing carrying a public right of way as regards the law or the behaviour expected of users.

 

Occupation crossings are only supposed to be used by the farmer concerned - and the user has no right to start demanding instant access or that they are kept waiting too long. They simply wait must until they get permission - however frustrating it might be.

Edited January 28, 2017 by phil-b259

[big jim]

Martins first point is what I've tried to highlight in my post in the last page about the failed 'main road' crossing last week, there were people willing to risk it as that barrier had been down for a good 30 mins at least between us being told about it and actually arriving at it