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Level crossing stupidity...


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Stop and stay or there won't be much left of you

No need of barriers when you have a high speed steel wall.

Keith

 

There is a small proportion of level crossing accidents that involve the road vehicle driving into the side of the train. Sometimes this is due to limited traction (ice, etc), but sometimes not. It is, I believe, the primary reason that NA freight cars (and black tanker cars in particular) are now required to have reflective conspicuity stripes on them. Remember that there are a lot of unsignalled level crossings in rural arreas so the only way of noticing that there is a train on the crossing is actually seeing the train - and if you arrive at night when a mile-long train is already on the crossing there will be no lights (the loco is long gone).

 

Adrian

Edited by Adrian Wintle
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Stop and stay or there won't be much left of you

Courtesy of Pete in another topic.

No need of barriers when you have a high speed steel wall.

Keith

 

Still won't stop the youngsters from trying to get across...or those much more interested with their Ipod or Iphone.

and it certainly wouldn't stop the Dukes of Hazzard!!!

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Seeing this behaviour makes me wonder whether creating fixed obsticals in the middle of the road leading up to AHB crossings will be a 100% block to zig-zagging. The driver at the front of the queue may be effectively blocked, but the determined idiot a couple of cars back may still try their luck around the fixed obstical and the AHB barriers.

 

Never underestimate others stupidity.

 

The barrier would be considerably longer than just one car! I expect the total length might vary according to what was practical, but I would expect the barrier to be long enough to trap at least the first five cars. So even if you were the second car in a two car queue, you would still have to reverse several car lengths before you reached the beginning of the barrier, and then drive on the wrong side of the road on the other side of the barrier for some distance before reaching the crossing. Chances are that by the time the sixth car arrives, the barriers have already been down some time and may well start to lift before he starts to even think about driving around.  Thus driving around the barrier is only an option for the last car in the queue, and even then a lot of  hassle!

Edited by Titan
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Thanks for your very comprehensive explanation, phil-b259.

 

I would like to ask one question of the ORR/HSE: How often, in real life, has a person tripped or collapsed on a level crossing, not moved clear but remained foul of the line and been struck by a train, or alternatively been saved by the Signaller observing them via CCTV ? In other words, what is the level of the risk that Network Rail have to guard against ?

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Thanks for your very comprehensive explanation, phil-b259.

 

I would like to ask one question of the ORR/HSE: How often, in real life, has a person tripped or collapsed on a level crossing, not moved clear but remained foul of the line and been struck by a train, or alternatively been saved by the Signaller observing them via CCTV ? In other words, what is the level of the risk that Network Rail have to guard against ?

 

Whilst I understand the reason for that perfectly valid question, the fact remains, under current risk assessment rules, that if a current arrangement at a crossing allows such an eventually to be detected, and that such an eventuality is reasonably possible, not probable, than the new replacement arrangement must not reduce the level of detection. It is possible to apply for exemptions for anything, but with little expectation of that being granted - there would have to be some extraordinary mitigating circumstance to appeal for a potential reduction in safe working. Such mitigation might be an adjacent footbridge with all possible pedestrian access to the crossing prevented. I have never seen such an arrangement and doubt it would be practically achievable.The fact that mud and dirt has obscured the detection system at one trial site, means the design or maintenance plan is wrong, and not that it is impractical (as one brave soul in the past tentatively suggested).

 

It would be a brave person who openly challenged the prevailing emotional response to crossing accidents. As you infer, when dealing with a limited budget, I would in the past have taken the normal actuary's position, on the basis of the insurable/mandated monetary value of a single life or serious injury multiplied by the likelihood of that event, to assess the cost benefit of any improvements, as were our instructions, indirectly, from the Treasury. However, the history of significant rail accidents (unlike road related deaths and injuries), in each case, has led to such calculations being mightily revised. This led from the Time Interval signalling system, via Absolute Block, continuous train braking, emergency passenger alarms, AWS, collision resistance standards, TPWS, and a host of many other costly improvements through to the banning of slam door stock (which the vast majority had used in reasonable safety for 150 years) etc.etc. I think this current situation, whilst not resulting particularly from one single accident but several, has created one such opinion shift, where such deaths are no longer socially acceptable. We probably look as askance on this as did the Victorians when they had to fence and gate their railways.

 

We often wonder why such standards, or attitudes, are not applied to road transport safety. Well, slowly but surely they are - drink/drugs driving, speeding, Pelicans replacing Zebras, seatbelts, collision impact resistance to pedestrians, MOTs, harder driving tests, more miles of safety barriers on urban streets. None of these things were issues when I was young, and there seemed to be just as much traffic in London as now, driving just as recklessly and with lousy brakes. However, there are still 2,000 + deaths a year, but that is around one third of previous decades. But you can be sure they will never have a zero deaths target until the technology may one day make that possible. F1 is nearly there (ski-ing accidents notwithstanding).....

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The barrier would be considerably longer than just one car! I expect the total length might vary according to what was practical, but I would expect the barrier to be long enough to trap at least the first five cars.

If you linked to that trial report Edwin_m mentioned earlier, 

RSSB did some research into median strips on the approach to crossings. 

 

http://www.rssb.co.u...stom.aspx?ID=98

the barrier they intended to try was not really a barrier at all, just a series of flexible, ie runnable over, posts sticking up from the centreline.

Keith

Edited by Grovenor
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There is a small proportion of level crossing accidents that involve the road vehicle driving into the side of the train. Sometimes this is due to limited traction (ice, etc), but sometimes not. It is, I believe, the primary reason that NA freight cars (and black tanker cars in particular) are now required to have reflective conspicuity stripes on them. Remember that there are a lot of unsignalled level crossings in rural arreas so the only way of noticing that there is a train on the crossing is actually seeing the train - and if you arrive at night when a mile-long train is already on the crossing there will be no lights (the loco is long gone).

 

Adrian

 

I believe there was a case at a crossing in Croydon where somebody walked into the side of a moving tram...

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There is a small proportion of level crossing accidents that involve the road vehicle driving into the side of the train. Sometimes this is due to limited traction (ice, etc), but sometimes not. It is, I believe, the primary reason that NA freight cars (and black tanker cars in particular) are now required to have reflective conspicuity stripes on them. Remember that there are a lot of unsignalled level crossings in rural arreas so the only way of noticing that there is a train on the crossing is actually seeing the train - and if you arrive at night when a mile-long train is already on the crossing there will be no lights (the loco is long gone).

 

Adrian

There was an incident where a driver was waiting for the train to pass when she was rear ended by a drunk driver and her car was pushed under a freight car between the trucks and was dragged a few miles, fortunately she survived.

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Thanks for your very comprehensive explanation, phil-b259.

 

I would like to ask one question of the ORR/HSE: How often, in real life, has a person tripped or collapsed on a level crossing, not moved clear but remained foul of the line and been struck by a train, or alternatively been saved by the Signaller observing them via CCTV ? In other words, what is the level of the risk that Network Rail have to guard against ?

I know of at least one crossing with a signal box next to it where the signaller regularly has to go and check on a local who seems to use the sound of the yodel as his train arriving in station signal and rushes out to the platform just as the barriers are about to close. 

seen him once collapse and the signaller was unable to clear the signals for the train until he had walked over and made sure that the guy was ok and clear of the line.

result train delayed

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  • 3 weeks later...
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Another RAIB report published today:

 

 http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources/140327_R062014_Buttington_Hall.pdf

 

Not relevant to the accident, but shows how nothing is ever simple -- would you have waited 50 minutes?

 

extract:

Closure of adjacent AHB crossing for 50 minutes in consequence of the accident:

90
After the collision the train stopped in a position which kept the barriers
down and wig-wags flashing at the nearby automatic half barrier (AHB)
crossing at Buttington. The crossing remained closed across the busy
A458 road for 50 minutes during which time witness evidence stated that
many road users zig-zagged round the barriers.

91
AHB crossings are arranged so that if a crossing is triggered spuriously and no
train is approaching it, the circuit times out after a few minutes and the barriers
are raised and the wig-wags extinguish. However, if a train triggers the crossing
but stops before reaching it, as happened here, the crossing remains in the
activated state with the barriers down and wig-wags flashing.

92
The crossing was triggered by the train before the accident and the barriers
remained lowered with the wig-wags flashing until Network Rail arranged for a
suitably qualified member of their staff to go to the crossing and switch it onto
local control. The crossing remained closed until 12:35 hrs. During this time road
traffic could not pass the crossing without ignoring the wig-wags and zig-zagging
round the barriers. Witness evidence stated that many vehicles did this. Some
road users called the signaller from the phone at the crossing, but he was not
legally allowed to authorise them to pass the wig-wags because they are road
traffic signs.

 

Martin.

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Another RAIB report published today:

 

 http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources/140327_R062014_Buttington_Hall.pdf

 

Not relevant to the accident, but shows how nothing is ever simple -- would you have waited 50 minutes?

 

extract:

Closure of adjacent AHB crossing for 50 minutes in consequence of the accident:

 

90

After the collision the train stopped in a position which kept the barriers

down and wig-wags flashing at the nearby automatic half barrier (AHB)

crossing at Buttington. The crossing remained closed across the busy

A458 road for 50 minutes during which time witness evidence stated that

many road users zig-zagged round the barriers.

 

91

AHB crossings are arranged so that if a crossing is triggered spuriously and no

train is approaching it, the circuit times out after a few minutes and the barriers

are raised and the wig-wags extinguish. However, if a train triggers the crossing

but stops before reaching it, as happened here, the crossing remains in the

activated state with the barriers down and wig-wags flashing.

 

92

The crossing was triggered by the train before the accident and the barriers

remained lowered with the wig-wags flashing until Network Rail arranged for a

suitably qualified member of their staff to go to the crossing and switch it onto

local control. The crossing remained closed until 12:35 hrs. During this time road

traffic could not pass the crossing without ignoring the wig-wags and zig-zagging

round the barriers. Witness evidence stated that many vehicles did this. Some

road users called the signaller from the phone at the crossing, but he was not

legally allowed to authorise them to pass the wig-wags because they are road

traffic signs.

 

Martin.

 

On the two AHB crossings on our maintenance area, the circuitry is the same as that which led to the fatal collision near Taunton. Basically if the crossing gets accidentally triggered by a treadle failure, if the signals on the approch to the crossing (and because they are AHBs the signals don't happen to be right on top of the crossing) are replaced to danger from the monitoring signal box, after 2 minutes the barriers will rise. However as soon as the signals are put back into auto mode then down the barriers come again which means that unless the train is actually standing at the signal, you could well get the barriers down for a lot longer.

 

Incidentally its worth noting that the RAIB are obviously unfaimilar with UK traffic laws because they state:-

 

The RAIB has identified the following key learning point for the railway industry:

 

Learning point 1

 

It is important that infrastructure managers, in conjunction with the police,

ensure that, when an automatic crossing is closed across the road for an

extended period due to a mishap, suitable measures are promptly taken to

manage the traffic, reopen the road and discourage road users from passing

the illuminated wig-wags without proper authorisation

 

Note the bit in bold, because that is utter b******t and downright illegal. The legislation is quite clear on this NOBODY has any authorisation as the RAIB put it to pass flashing wigwags and to be quite frank its something they should know by heart.

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On the two AHB crossings on our maintenance area, the circuitry is the same as that which led to the fatal collision near Taunton. Basically if the crossing gets accidentally triggered by a treadle failure, if the signals on the approch to the crossing (and because they are AHBs the signals don't happen to be right on top of the crossing) are replaced to danger from the monitoring signal box, after 2 minutes the barriers will rise. However as soon as the signals are put back into auto mode then down the barriers come again which means that unless the train is actually standing at the signal, you could well get the barriers down for a lot longer.

 

Incidentally its worth noting that the RAIB are obviously unfaimilar with UK traffic laws because they state:-

 

The RAIB has identified the following key learning point for the railway industry:

 

Learning point 1

 

It is important that infrastructure managers, in conjunction with the police,

ensure that, when an automatic crossing is closed across the road for an

extended period due to a mishap, suitable measures are promptly taken to

manage the traffic, reopen the road and discourage road users from passing

the illuminated wig-wags without proper authorisation

 

Note the bit in bold, because that is utter b******t and downright illegal. The legislation is quite clear on this NOBODY has any authorisation as the RAIB put it to pass flashing wigwags and to be quite frank its something they should know by heart.

Which is said at one point in the report (paragraph 92)

 

 

Some road users called the signaller from the phone at the crossing, but he was not legally allowed to authorise them to pass the wig-wags because they are road traffic signs.
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There ought to be someone somewhere with sufficient authority. I find it very difficult to believe that there is not a single official in any organisation that cannot give someone authority. If it is solely a legal issue then the law needs to be changed.

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Which is said at one point in the report (paragraph 92)

 

So why add a "learning point" (which presumably is meant to be acted on in future) at the end which appears to suggest exactly the opposite. All they needed to do was stop once they got to ".....the illuminated wig-wags."

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There ought to be someone somewhere with sufficient authority. I find it very difficult to believe that there is not a single official in any organisation that cannot give someone authority. If it is solely a legal issue then the law needs to be changed.

 

Nope, the legislation is quite clear NOBODY can. In past times it was the case that a uniformed Police officer had the power - HOWEVER they were under NO OBLIGATION to actually contact the railway authorities / signalman before waving people across and it was to close this loophole (including eliminating the possibilities for communication errors) that the law was changed.

 

Besides the whole point about wig-wags is they are used at places where it is essential for safety that people don't go past them when illuminated - hence their use at places like swing & lift bridges - not just level crossings (though Tower Bridge gets away with ordinary traffic lights for some reason)

 

Regular traffic lights on the other hand can be disregarded upon instruction by a uniformed police officer and that is why they cannot be used at level crossings. Personally I would be vary wary about letting the same occur at level crossings simply because the Police in general are not very 'clued up' on railway issues and the temptation to do something dangerous is all too easy.

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  • 3 weeks later...

A surprisingly balanced report on the pros and cons of level crossing closure. Always going to be a contentious debate because of the conflict between the desire for near-100% safety and the 'why should a one in 23,000 year event inconvenience us' stance. It seems the final decision on these lies with the local council(s) concerned, NR only providing report and advice. I can see where the protesters are coming from where they say that the possible detour route for a proposed crossing closure can be more dangerous than the crossing itself...

 

On a lighter note, any idea where the location of the black-and-white picture near the bottom of the report is?

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One from the Czech Republic for you.

 

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-27137939

 

I'm also amazed that none of the car drivers appears to get out and see if the old boy is OK

Unlike in Hungary where there appears to be a law requiring that drivers stop to give assistance at the scene of an accident.  Which can lead to carnage on their motorways as all vehicles come to an emergency stop on both carriageways so as not to be found breaking the law - cars usually stopped and left in dangerous positions across all carriageways to the point that they hamper the arrival of emergency services!

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