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The shrinking Royal Navy


Ohmisterporter
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The Afghanistan deployments have depended on naval movements to keep them supported. The inter-theater movements are mainly by air but supplying fuel and stores from out of theatre by air would be ruinous and not viable. Taking an armoured battle group as something similar to a battalion with main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, engineers, artillery support etc then you might move it over short distance by air or in extremis forward deploy over long distance but you're looking at an awful lot of air movements for the initial move followed by constant movements to get in the fuel and other consumables. Unless you can use forward stores bases supplied either overland or by sea it just isn't viable.

Edited by jjb1970
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oes anybody else remember the TGA Sirius S90 "short fat frigate" controversey of the 1980's? Probably the only time naval architecture has ever been noticed by politicians and the world. Even now I still meet the odd person claiming it was all part of an establishment conspiracy and that warships should be short and fat in total obliviousness to just what a bonkers idea a fat semi-planing frigate was.

 

Quite interesting to compare that with your earlier post about the pattern of RN design and the lead up to the 'Leanders' (which I take as a particular benchmark for the culmination of a series of designs) where the hull length and aspect ratio had grown to be specifically matched to a need to operate in the North Atlantic in all seasons and sea states.   I for one could never quite reconcile the 'short & fat' idea with the previous experience that had led to a particular school of design and the dimensions it incorporated in order to meet teh task.

 

Incidentally I understand that certain 'large warship' has left the dockyard basin in order that someone somewhere can announce it is no longer 'in dock' 

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The Afghanistan deployments have depended on naval movements to keep them supported. The inter-theater movements are mainly by air but supplying fuel and stores from out of theatre by air would be ruinous and not viable. Taking an armoured battle group as something similar to a battalion with main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, engineers, artillery support etc then you might move it over short distance by air or in extremis forward deploy over long distance but you're looking at an awful lot of air movements for the initial move followed by constant movements to get in the fuel and other consumables. Unless you can use forward stores bases supplied either overland or by sea it just isn't viable.

 

To follow on, with UK forces in Afghanistan critical/sensitive vehicles and stores were usually flown in from "friendly"  Middle Eastern states (e.g. UAE and Oman) having been brought out from the UK by sea. Less sensitive items like general stores, fuel etc were brought in overland from Pakistan having been taken there by sea.

The problem with all that was that it caused major problems with the C17 aircraft due to the short and regular duration of the flights such that the number of take off/landing evolutions massively exceeded those planned for during the design life of the aircraft leading to all sorts of unforeseen and expensive fatigue problems.

With Iraq having a deepwater port like Umm Qasr available, all UK forces stores, equipment, ammo and vehicles were taken to/from there by sea from Marchwood Military Port (Southampton).

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oes anybody else remember the TGA Sirius S90 "short fat frigate" controversey of the 1980's? Probably the only time naval architecture has ever been noticed by politicians and the world. Even now I still meet the odd person claiming it was all part of an establishment conspiracy and that warships should be short and fat in total obliviousness to just what a bonkers idea a fat semi-planing frigate was.

I had to Google that, but what's interesting is the notion that 'I have a great idea that will transform everything, and there's a reactionary conspiracy by the establishment to stop it'. It's a theme that crops up repeatedly in science and technology.

 

I remember encountering something similar as a student from some of my lecturers, who was convinced that his great ideas on software development were being ignored by industry due to some vaguely defined combination of inertia, stupidity and corruption. 

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The whole short fat legacy left a legacy of bitterness amongst naval constructors. The government basically ignored the professional advice of its own constructors and technical experts seemingly based on not much more than a mantra or the private sector must be best and some sort of institutional distrust of people who knew what they were talking about. TGA’s idea of scaling up a semi-planing motor launch hull to the size of a major warship was inherently problematic at best and not practical. Something not noted by the ideas supporters at the time was that every other navy looked at the idea when it was published and none of them decided to have a go, supporters still point to short fat warships built as OPVs and completely ignore the whole point of the TGA proposal, it wasn’t a short fat proposal but a short fat semi-planing proposal. The government spent a lot of money, commissioning Lloyd’s Register to investigate the TGA hull form against the T23 hull and verify TGA’s claims. LR confirmed what naval architects and hydrodynamicists already knew, it was a dumb idea that wouldn’t work and were promptly sued by TGA and dismissed as just another part of the establishment conspiracy. That really backfired on TGA in terms of their own reputation as LR were (and for the most part still are) very highly respected for both technical expertise and independence. Even if the proposal was sensible (and to be clear, planning and semi-planing designs are excellent for smaller vessels needing very high speed, that was never in dispute) the idea of a semi-planing ASW frigate where quietness is almost everything was bizarre. The T23 needed speed but nothing like as much as it needed quietness. There is also endurance, even if the RN needed a 40kt frigate (I’m sure it’d like 40kt speeds but it didn’t need them) how far do you think a frigate could get at 40kts before needing to re-fuel? Not very. And at lower speeds planning and semi-planing hull forms don’t plane and lose their advantages ofver a displacement hull. The whole episode was as if somebody had proposed fitting trains with hexagonal wheels because they’re better than round ones and being taken seriously.

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Regards transporting equipment overland from Pakistani ports to Afghanistan; I am certain that it depended in part on the goodwill of the Taliban. The fact that they could, and did, stop deliveries at any time unless a suitable "gift" was received is but one of the bizarre stories to come out of the Afghan War.

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One of the things about the Taliban is that as with ISIS and Al Queda it seems to be a coalition and as much about local loyalties (and otherwise) as political/theological ideology. The loyalties and relationships appear to be quite fluid.

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Manpower has been a limiting factor for the RN since the 1950's. Some of the unpopular decisions taken in the 50's and 60's on the composition of the fleet and vessel design were as much about manpower limitations as funding.

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The latest offering from the Think Defence blog is this longish read about UK amphibious capability. I found it interesting and hope you do too.

 

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/uk-amphibious-capabilities/futures/

 

And at present we're distinctly short of one, apart from Ocean - and manpower is a major problem which looks to be getting worse.

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The latest offering from the Think Defence blog is this longish read about UK amphibious capability. I found it interesting and hope you do too.

 

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/uk-amphibious-capabilities/futures/

 

Very logically thought through, even if I did not fully understand or have sufficient knowledge to follow the actual formations extant and proposed.

 

But the key issue for me is where would such amphibious capability be used in future? The author acknowledges most European coasts are much more heavily built up than in 1944, as are many North African and increasingly Middle Eastern potential landing sites, making the task much, much harder and requiring resources we simply do not have, on the scale of the USA. He suggests the Arctic as the most likely area for such tasks (within the RN's operational areas these days - East of Suez has long gone).

 

Given the re-emergence of a potential Russian threat, it is hard to see where the UK's armed forces could realistically, strategically, match numbers or firepower, so that specialist operations remain our key asset, and amphibious operations for special forces need only what we have, or will have (hopefully). Our key strategic assets remain our submarines, cyber-intelligence and the nuclear deterrent. Everything else just has tactical or policing capability. Finding a strategic purpose for our military is the name of the game, and successive strategic reviews remain inconclusive, featuring budget and manpower issues as the headlines.

 

CEPP remains a strategy seeking a purpose, along with capability, given the evident gaps in what we would need to really project such power. What I do not really understand is why our government focusses on power projection, when defence of the realm is their primary purpose, one for which our military is still, not inconsiderably, incapable (bar intelligence). I am sure there is an argument somewhere that says CEPP is the best form of defence, but when we cannot even lay mines to defend our shores, let alone adequately patrol them, I fail to see the logic.

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And at present we're distinctly short of one, apart from Ocean - and manpower is a major problem which looks to be getting worse.

 

We may not even have OCEAN for much longer.

Rumours are spreading like wildfire that she's being lined up for a "hot sale" (i.e. operational and ready to go) to Brazil next year, thereby leaving us with no carrier capability be it fixed or rotary wing for circa 4 years until QE becomes fully operational.

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Ocean is definitely going - the MoD have confirmed that part. She was designed to last 20 years, and entered service 19 years ago. Flogging it off to Brazilian should fit in with their Government's desire to buy other peoples knackered cast off aircraft carriers, and then wonder why they don't work properly. 

 

I think QE should be operational sooner than that - the 2021/2 date seems to be for the UK having enough Lightnings to make a decent fixed wing air group. Helicopters should come sooner - there have been news stories about the anti-submarine Merlins working up ready to operate off the ship already. 

 

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/news-and-latest-activity/news/2017/april/10/170410-820-ready-to-protect 

 

Of course, some of these dates may slip backwards (but oddly the 'old stuff going' dates never move forward to compensate....). 

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Did their ex-French carrier ever really enter service with the Brazilian Navy? I spent quite a bit of time in Niteroi in the mid 00's directly opposite where she was tied up and I never saw her move.

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Did their ex-French carrier ever really enter service with the Brazilian Navy? I spent quite a bit of time in Niteroi in the mid 00's directly opposite where she was tied up and I never saw her move.

 

She did, and when on exercise even operated with Argentinian pilots at one point.

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If Wikipedia is to be believed, it worked for couple of years in the early 2000s and then caught fire, leading to an endless cycle of repairs and further problems. They seemed to have similar issues with their previous (ex RN) carrier.

 

Sounds similar to the story of French hovercraft, one of which burned down in Bordeaux and the other retired to the apron at Ramsgate after a disastrous short career, which they invented by the way, apparently, according to their history books - I never knew Lowestoft (Christopher Cockerill's birthplace, and incidentally also mine) was in France, so that is the basis of my application to remain a French citizen.......

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Sounds similar to the story of French hovercraft, one of which burned down in Bordeaux and the other retired to the apron at Ramsgate after a disastrous short career, which they invented by the way, apparently, according to their history books - I never knew Lowestoft (Christopher Cockerill's birthplace, and incidentally also mine) was in France, so that is the basis of my application to remain a French citizen.......

Rather like how the Americans claim to have invented the computer (by setting an arbitrary definition of the first 'modern' computer that just happens to match their first attempt). 

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In case you have not seen this, and not directly applicable to Royal Navy carriers, but President Trump has made some comment regarding the EMALS versus steam catapult as fitted to US carriers and proposed for QEC at one time. 

http://warnewsupdates.blogspot.co.uk/2017/05/president-trump-has-beef-with-navys.html

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The Think Defence blog has this fairly comprehensive article on Royal Navy mine countermeasures. I have put it here rather than start a new thread because it is line with the fleet reductions despite our undeniable expertise in this field. Hope you find this of interest.

 

http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/umm-qasr-unmanned-warrior-royal-navy-mine-countermeasures/

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